Subject to suspicion: feminism and anti-statism in Britain by Segal, Lynne
Only state intervention and welfare reforms can put an end to women’s
economic dependency, and thereby free women from men’s control, that
doughty feminist reformer Eleanor Rathbone argued just over eighty years
ago.1 How her old statist rhetoric betrays her. Women’s economic depen-
dency and welfare reforms are currently on everyone’s minds, but in an
ambience generating thoughts only of purging most of those receiving
any benefits at all.
Today in Britain, in the long shadow of the United States, the political
usage of the term economic dependency is being definitively transformed.
The notion of welfare benefit no longer promises the hard-fought-for
amelioration, but rather the definitive symptom, of dependency: the erst-
while utopian cure is resignified as the disease. It is some years since
Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon traced the genealogical transformation
of dependency in the United States, noting its conjunction with a flourish-
ing, deceptively feminist-sounding self-help literature on autonomy.2 This
is why single mothers can be demonized if they don’t work, even while
married women with young children can be demonized if they do. Shifting
a mother from dependency on the state to reliance on a man for economic
support, in this troubling slippage, supposedly removes her from the
pathologies of dependency. It is a massive deception.
The continuing offensive against welfare provides perhaps the single
most general threat to Western women’s interests at present—at least for
those many women who are not wealthy and who still take the major
responsibility for caring work in the home. As feminists in the 1970s
made so clear, and sought so hard to transform, women are most vulner-
able to the very worst pathologies of dependency when they are most at
the mercy of husbands or male partners, especially during and after preg-
nancy and childbirth. Indeed, midwives in Britain have recently been
asked to look for signs of abuse in just such women, following alarming
reports from the United States examining the bruised bodies of pregnant
women and those who have recently become mothers.3 Similar antitheses
exist in relation to needy children. Carolyn Steedman has written elo-
quently of how the expansion of welfare in the late 1940s gave a particu-
lar confidence to working-class children like herself:
Lynne Segal
Subject to Suspicion
FEMINISM AND ANTISTAT ISM IN BR ITA IN
Social Text 62, Vol. 18, No. 1, Spring 2000. Copyright © 2000 by Duke University Press.
7. Segal  2/11/00  10:49 AM  Page 143
I think I would be a different person now if orange juice and milk and dinners
at school hadn’t told me, in a covert way, that I had a right exist, was worth
something . . . its central benefit being that, unlike my mother, the state asked
for nothing in return. Psychic structures are shaped by these huge historical
labels: “charity,” “philanthropy,” “state intervention.”4
Liz Heron echoes these sentiments, although, like Steedman herself,
she was well aware of the limitations of such services: it was their pater-
nalistic, undemocratic delivery that made them vulnerable to subsequent
attack. Introducing her anthology of autobiographical writings by girls
growing up in Britain in the 1950s, Heron writes: “Along with the orange
juice and the cod-liver oil, the malt supplement and the free school milk,
we may also have absorbed a certain sense of our own worth and the
sense of a future that would get better and better, as if history were on our
side.”5 Not any more! The shedding of public responsibility for the wel-
fare of poorer women threatens to devastate the lives of millions of chil-
dren in Britain, just as it has already done in the United States over the
last two decades.6
Increasingly in Britain the new myth of “dependency culture” is used
to condemn those receiving any form of state service, marking them out as
vulnerable to “welfare dependency.” Yet, despite the hassles and indigni-
ties they now face, surveys of single mothers have shown that a majority
would still prefer dependency on the state to their experience of depen-
dency on a man.7 That option is now disappearing. In alliance with Rea-
gan and the American Right, there was no doubting Margaret Thatcher’s
determination to overturn all traces of the postwar Keynesian economic
orthodoxy with its support for spending on welfare—while upholding and
abetting warfare spending. What is somewhat less clear is the extent to
which the Blair government, like Clinton’s “New” Democratic Party, is
simply a continuation of the same proscarcity neoliberal policies under-
mining the public realm while encouraging market forces into every insti-
tutional domain.
To date, Blair’s self-declared respect for his Tory predecessors, his
unlimited admiration for Clinton (despite the latter’s capitulation to dis-
mantling welfare), his government’s tireless discourse of fiscal “prudence”
and obeisance toward the dynamism of unfettered market forces, and his
comprehensive ardor for Britain’s “special relationship” with the United
States have all impeded the production of any distinct or convincing alter-
native vision to the one he inherited. The legacy of neoliberalism leaves
the United Kingdom, in marked contrast to the rest of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), tailing the United States in its soaring inequal-
ity, with poverty in the United States estimated at twice that of any other
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European nation, despite having the highest per capita income. (Sweden,
with the longest tradition of social democratic organizations, still has the
lowest incidence of poverty and inequality).8
Searching for a third way between the interventionist market con-
straints of welfare states and the turbulence of neoliberalism, Blair—like
Clinton—has moved toward what has been labeled the “new paternal-
ism.”9 This third way fully endorses the earlier neoliberal “modernizing”
crusade on restraining public spending while insisting that market eco-
nomics must reign supreme. Its characteristic paternalism (better seen as
a new managerialism, in that women are as likely as men to implement its
objectives) aims to tackle the escalating poverty, inequality, crime, and
social disintegration through closer supervision of the poor: rectifying
what is seen as their personal inadequacies or fecklessness. Demanding an
end to the “poverty of ambition,” social deprivation and welfare are to be
reduced and managed through welfare-to-work regimes, with strong
encouragement of private-sector backing for training and resources in the
public sector: from the teaching of parenting skills or job application tech-
niques to finance and pension management.10 However, there is scant
evidence that workfare serves as a springboard to real jobs (initial studies
of the program’s success in New York reveal that only 29 percent of work-
fare participants forced off the welfare rolls were able to find even casual
work).11 Meanwhile, although in acute tension with its aim of creating the
fullest possible employment of poor and needy people (many of whom are
women caring for children or other dependents), recent attempts to roll
back welfare have also strongly encouraged the promotion of traditional,
patriarchal family ideology.
In stark contrast with the repeated avowal of the “pathologies” of
welfare dependency is the steadfast disavowal of knowledge of the actual
casualties when women and children are most financially dependent on
familial male authority. Such denial has been strenuously cultivated by the
growing strength of “family values” campaigners over the last two
decades. The “profamily” movements that arose in the 1970s were part of
an explicit New Right backlash against feminism and sexual liberation,
soon to be underwritten by Reagan and Thatcher. However, two decades
later such rhetoric seems ubiquitous across the political spectrum. Mean-
while, the knowledge that the traditional heterosexual marriage can create
a living hell of cruelty, neglect, and abuse is beaten back by what Ameri-
can sociologist Judith Stacey calls the “virtual social science” of distorted
data about the perils of “fatherless,” “divorced,” or “lone” parent families
constantly disseminated by the media.12 This not only encourages the
continuing denial of lesbian and gay rights but also dismisses the often
invaluable role of friendships, community resources, and wider structures
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of social support, which may be all that many individuals have to rely on
to keep them sane.
From Britain, looking anxiously at trends across the Atlantic, one can
observe that the once explicit, but now more often disguised or denied,
antifeminist and antigay sentiments expressed in family values crusades
are all of a piece with a sweeping antistatist rhetoric—increasingly as
prevalent on the Left as on the Right. I was dismayingly alerted to further
political reversals that may lie ahead for antiquated socialist feminists such
as myself by recent thoughts about the state expressed by that once endur-
ingly hopeful and combative feminist radical (and old friend of mine)
Barbara Ehrenreich. In her “Confessions of a Recovering Statist,” she
publicly renounces any hopes for progressive social reforms in the United
States, whether around child care or parental leave (or environmental
reform). “For the time being,” she declares, “we’re not going to get any-
where with a progressive agenda consisting of . . . government initiatives.
Believe me, I have tried.”13 And she certainly has.
Ehrenreich contrasts the situation in the United States with the kinds
of universal state provision she assumes is taken for granted in Western
Europe. She argues that there is now no combating the Right’s antistate
propaganda in the United States: that is, after two decades of radical con-
servative pressure, and after Clinton’s welfare “reform,” which removed
federal responsibility for assisting children in poverty while at the same
time authorizing millions of dollars to be spent not on sex education, con-
traception, or to prevent violence against women, but rather on a puritan-
ical morality that consigns single mothers to courses in “abstinence edu-
cation” (Clinton’s way of having sex, perhaps). Other feminist political
scientists based in the United States, such as Zillah Eisenstein and Anna
Marie Smith, also express their increasing suspicions of the costs of what
they call the “insider strategy.” They believe that feminist support for
Clinton facilitated his successful presentation of “feminine” and “femi-
nist” signifiers, making women’s votes decisive in his reelection in 1996
(with the largest gender gap in the history of U.S. presidential voting), but
ultimately helping to neutralize opposition to his welfare cuts.14 Even some
of the most sophisticated theoretical works, like Wendy Brown’s States of
Injury—which skillfully exposes both the logic of victimhood and the the-
oretical incoherence in feminist rhetoric like Catharine MacKinnon’s
demand for legal protection from “pornographic” imagery—retain a near
exclusive focus on “the state as a negative domain for democratic political
transformation,” stressing the “perils” attending all feminist appeals to it
for gender justice.15 Without wanting to deny the oppressive role of the
modern state (not only in its official policing and militaristic role but also
in its protection of already dominant groups via normative regimes regu-
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lating access to welfare and social resources), it seems to me that those
seeking a better world for all women can hardly afford to abandon strug-
gles “in and against” it.
Meanwhile, although terminally pessimistic about feminists having
any progressive alignment with mainstream politics in the United States,
Ehrenreich herself is perhaps too optimistic about Europe. Here too, wel-
fare “reform” is underway. Some feminists in Britain are watching the
New Labor government with their initial rising hopes moving toward
despairing resignation, and wondering how long Anglo-American con-
trasts will hold.16 There has been some progress, with support for child
care for single mothers to encourage (or will it mean force?) them into
jobs. But Blair’s new Britain, as we have seen, still sanctifies the
Thatcherite and old American way, with its litany for limiting public
spending. As Mary McIntosh comments on the production of new termi-
nology for the redefining of social needs: “Typical of the new lexicon is
the “Benefit Integrity Project,” in which thousands of people who had
previously been deemed severely disabled were deprived of their Disabil-
ity Living Allowance.”17
Such shifts in the vernacular of needs and entitlement indicate that it
is the notion of universal welfare rights (as opposed to meager provision
for the poor) that is being eliminated. This serves to undermine the whole
heritage and rationale of the British welfare state: one that relied on pro-
gressive taxation to deliver a comprehensive social insurance system, giv-
ing those in need of benefit a sense of entitlement. Using the defense that
the “deserving” poor—those who are absolutely unable to work for wages
or have no crumb of private resources—can only be adequately assisted by
removing benefits from the more “affluent,” progressive legislation involv-
ing general entitlements to child benefits, disability, or old-age pensions is
now under threat in Britain. Increasingly more people will have increas-
ingly less reason to support a national insurance system from which they
will, in principle, be excluded, feeding the destructively antisocial,
antigovernment feelings now so dominant in the United States: the sense
that people get nothing in return for the taxes they pay, since they must
take out private insurance for everything anyway. It has also been shown
that welfare programs regularly deteriorate once they assist only the most
disadvantaged, and once they no longer cater for more powerful, middle-
class interest groups.18 Comparing the failure of U.S. rationing with the
success of austerity measures in Britain during World War II, Harvey
Levenstein concludes that the British, unlike the Americans, still had
“faith in their government.”19 In this age of socially regulated austerity,
that faith in government and the social infrastructure of the public sector
is being deliberately undermined.
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With incentives to work as the prime focus of welfare reform, the
hardship faced by significant numbers of women looks here to stay. These
are the women trapped between the Scylla of longer hours at work and the
Charybdis of increasing demands from children and other needy people at
home, for which they are still held, and often feel, uniquely responsible.
No amount of hollow familial ideology, contradictory workfare incentives,
or redefining of equality as “social inclusion” solves the problems faced by
so many working women today. As Suzanne Franks concludes, “It seems
unlikely the new millennium will bring a new balance of working and
sharing—more likely a society that exacerbates the all or nothing divi-
sions. Work will mean either the all-consuming 60-hour week or the inse-
cure temporary life. Caring and everything else will have to fit in
between.”20
As I see it, feminist concerns cannot be separated from struggles for
an alternative vision and politics to those now so dismissive of any pro-
gressive possibilities of state intervention. Child-care provision, expanding
social services, state regulation of minimum wages and maximum working
hours, recognition of household diversity, and strong incentives for the full
sharing of caring in the home would all form part of that vision—not
unlike the socialist feminist agenda of a recent proscribed era. Accepting
its elimination, Toril Moi has commented that “‘socialist feminism’ is not
really a meaningful term in the 1990s”; curiously, though, she does want
to know “what kind of feminist a socialist feminist could be today.” The
creature is dead, but her specter survives her.21 The decline and dispar-
agement of feminist calls on the state are everywhere encouraged by the
liberal promotion of the dubious doctrine that nation-states are today nec-
essarily powerless in the face of market globalization.22 Yet the market
dictatorship that has fostered the crisis of public finance, allowing the
wealthy worldwide to contribute less and less to the financing of public
expenditure, is still dominated by Anglo-American capital and ideological
convictions. There are continuing, large differences in state expenditures
on welfare, with—contrary to most globalization rhetoric—no consistent
effect on growth rates.23 Moreover, the global economy always displays
strong national elements. While transnational corporations currently oper-
ate in the context of volatile world financial markets, both the production
and consumption of most goods and services occurs at national levels:
only 15 percent of commodities derive from lower-wage countries.24 Pro-
gressives have every reason to combat rather than accede to simplistic
assertions about the disappearance of the state in some forms of global-
ization theory. It is this thinking that abets the collapse of democratic pol-
itics, as participation in the market substitutes for participation in politics.
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Only a decade ago, feminists still hoped to transform the relations
between employment and family lives. Today, Blair’s new Britain installs
an old and punishing “work” ethic that, despite three decades of feminist
attention to the “labors of love,” remains incapable of questioning any of
the old terms—whether that of labor or love. A decade ago, there was still
a debate in the British and American media on the future of the nuclear
family. Today the superiority of that family structure over all possible
alternatives is once again everywhere trumpeted, even as its prevalence
continues to decline. In the most technologically innovative of times, as
some feminists write of women’s particular affinity with the supposed
freedoms of cyberspace (despite men’s dominance of 90 percent of its
highways),25 many women face a future where we are leading the most
comprehensively conservative of lives: less politically engaged, less utopian
in vision, less time, even, for friends and family. 
Writing of the unexpected decline of leisure in the United States,
Juliet Schor points out that for the last three decades there has been a
steady increase in the number of hours on the job put in by fully
employed workers; the same alarms about expanding working hours are
now sounding in the United Kingdom.26 It is primarily women who are
still somehow expected to make up for the hours lost from creating loving
homes and healthy communities while simultaneously applauded for how
far they have come in gaining equality with men. Given the persistent
strength of this aspect of traditional gender ideology, it is, as it always has
been, the daily lives of women that most directly absorb the shocks and
contradictions of these mean yet widely disparate times. What women do,
when they do what is most expected of them as women, is not something
best organized according to the dictates of profit or capitalist market rela-
tions. Therein lies the radical potential of feminism as an oppositional pol-
itics: one that dares to fight a culture and a political system which tries to
numb us into accepting that it can fulfill our needs and desires through
notions of consumer sovereignty alone.
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